It is proposed that phenomenal awareness, the ability to be aware of one's sensations and feelings, emerges from the capacity of evolved brains to represent their own cognitive processes by iterating and reapplying on themselves the cortical operations that generate representations of the outer world. Search for the neuronal substrate of awareness therefore converges with the search for the cognitive mechanisms through which brains represent their environment. The hypothesis is put forward that the mammalian brain uses two complementary representational strategies. One consists of the generation of neurons responding selectively to particular constellations of features and is based on selective recombination of inputs in hierarchically structured feed-forward architectures. The other relies on the dynamic association of feature specific cells into functionally coherent cell assemblies which as a whole represent the constellation of features defining a particular perceptual object. Arguments are presented which favour the notion that the meta-representations supporting awareness are established according to the second strategy. Reviewing experimental data the question is then investigated whether evolved brains utilize assembly codes and if so how assemblies are defined. The hypothesis is forwarded that assemblies self-organize through transient synchronization of the discharges of the respective neurons and evidence is presented that the prerequisites for the occurrence of these synchronization phenomena on the one hand and for awareness on the other are similar. Furthermore, it is argued that self-consciousness cannot be explained in the same way as phenomenal awareness, because it requires for its emergence not only the generation of metarepresentations of the brain's own cognitive operations but the dialogue between different brains through which these can become aware of their autonomy.
Introduction
The term 'consciousness' has a number of different connotations ranging from awareness of one's perceptions and sensations to self-awareness, the perception of oneself as an agent that is endowed with intentionality and free will. In this contribution I take the position that the first connotation of consciousness, phenomenal awareness, should in principle be tractable within neurobiological description systems because the problem can probably be reduced to the question how neuronal representations are organized. The latter connotations, by contrast, transcend purely neurobiological descriptions, because they have a social, a cultural and a historical dimension.
The Inner Eye
Brains capable of processing signals at a conscious level appear to have the ability to represent the outcome of their distributed computational operations in a common format.
These meta-representations comprise protocols not only of sensory and motor processes but also of the state of value assigning systems. Thus, brains that have consciousness possess a representational meta-level at which internal states are explicitly represented, they have, what one might call, an "inner eye" function. They can compare protocols of their own performance with incoming signals and derive from the outcome of these "internal deliberations" decisions for future acts. This allows them to respond with more flexibility to changing conditions than brains that lack consciousness and are confined to reacting to stimuli without the option of further reflection and internal deliberation. The intercalation of a further processing step between primary sensory computations and the programming of motor responses has obvious adaptive functions and this may have contributed to the evolution of brains capable of being conscious of their own performance.
In order to run protocols of processes occurring within the brain, additional cognitive structures are required that analyse these processes and generate neuronal representations of them. Thus, implementation of monitoring functions requires second order processing levels which generate meta-representations of the computational results provided by first order processes. The most likely substrate for such operations are cortical areas that have been added in the course of evolution and that treat the output of lower order cortical areas in the same way as these treat input from the sensory periphery (Krubitzer, 1998) . The inner eye function could thus be realized by a reflexive iteration of selfsimilar cortical functions. This interpretation is compatible with the neuroanatomical evidence that the phylogenetically more recent cortical areas are remote from primary sensory input and interact mainly, either through the thalamus or directly through cortico-cortical connections, with areas of lower order.
If these more recent monitoring structures have in turn access to the motor system -and available evidence indicates that this is the case -brains endowed with such monitoring functions would in addition have the possibility to signal to other organisms the result of the internal monitoring. Through mimics, gestures, vocalizations and in humans also language, such brains could signal to others what their perceptions, intentions, value-assignments and action plans are. As such information increases dramatically the predictability of future actions of the respective other, it is likely to have an important function in the stabilization of labour sharing societies; yet another adaptive function of consciousness that could have favoured its evolution.
Two arguments, one based on evolution and the other on ontogeny, suggest that consciousness is a graded phenomenon whereby the gradations are correlated with the phylogenetic and ontogenetic differentiation of the cerebral cortex. The evolutionary argument is derived from the evidence that brains have evolved gradually, the most recent evolutionary changes being confined to an expansion of cerebral cortex and the aposition of new cortical areas. This suggests that consciousness evolved as a consequence of cortical expansion and therefore is probably not an all or none phenomenon. The ontogenetic argument is based on the observation that the various manifestations of consciousness from rudimentary awareness of sensations to the fully expressed self-consciousness of the adult go in parallel with the gradual maturation of cerebral structures, in particular of the phylogenetically more recent cortical areas.
If one accepts the scenario that the aspect of consciousness that we address as phenomenal awareness results from an iteration of the same cognitive operations that support primary sensory processing, the explanatory gap reduces itself to the question how the cerebral cortex processes signals and generates representations. If this question is answered with respect to primary sensory functions, the discovered strategies should be generalizeable to the formation of meta-representations, the rerepresentation of some of the brains' own computational operations that serves as the substrate for the postulated inner eye function.
Self-consciousness
However, there are other aspects of consciousness such as self-awareness and the experience of individuality that seem to require explanations which transcend purely neurobiological reductionism. It is my perception that the ontological status of these phenomena differs from that of the qualia of phenomenal awareness and that it are these aspects of consciousness that give rise to the hard problems in the philosophy of mind and provide the incentive for adopting dualistic positions. The most challenging phenomenon in this context is that we perceive ourselves as agents that are endowed with the freedom to decide, implying that the self is actually capable of controlling by will processes in the brain. We experience these aspects of consciousness as immaterial mental entities that are capable of influencing the neuronal processes required for the execution of actions and, hence, we perceive them as not derivable from the material processes in the brain.
I propose that these latter connotations of consciousness differ from phenomenal awareness because they require for their development interactions among brains that are sufficiently differentiated to be able to generate a theory of mind. Such brains need to have phenomenal awareness and in addition the ability to signal to one another and to comprehend that they are endowed with this capacity; they need to be able to enter dialogues of the kind "I know that you know how I feel" or "I know that you know what my intentions are", etc. My proposal is that the experience of the "self" with all its subjective mental attributes emerges from such dialogues among human beings, above all from the early interactions between caregivers and babies. The experience of individuality and responsibility, and as a consequence the intuition that one is endowed with free will would then have to be considered as a product of social interactions. The subjective attributes of consciousness would have the ontological status of social realities, of cultural constructs, and would, therefore, transcend pure neurobiological description systems that focus on individual brains.
The mechanisms that enable us to experience ourselves as endowed with mental capacities do, of course, reside in individual brains but the contents of this experience are derived from social interactions. But why then should the experience of the self be so obviously different from other experiences that we also derive from social interactions? One explanation could be that the dialogue that leads to the experience of the self is initiated already during a very early developmental stage, before episodic memory matures and begins to keep track of what the brain experiences. If so, there would be no conscious record of the processes that led to the experience of the self and the associated subjective connotations of consciousness. Because of this amnesia these early experiences would lack causation, they would appear as timeless and detached from any real world context. In consequence, the subjective connotations of consciousness, although they have been acquired by learning, would be perceived as having transcendental qualities that resist reductionistic explanations.
Two representational strategies
If the argument is valid that the internal monitoring functions that lead to meta-representations rest on the same cognitive operations as the sensory processes which deal with signals conveyed by the sense organs, search for the neuronal substrate of phenomenal awareness converges with the search for the structure of neuronal representations in general. In the following paragraphs I shall, therefore, expose hypotheses on the putative structure of neuronal representations.
The working hypothesis proposed here is that evolved brains use two complementary strategies in order to represent contents (see also Singer, 1995) . The first strategy is thought to rely on individual neurons that are tuned to particular constellations of input activity. Through their selective responses these neurons establish explicit representations of particular constellations of features. It is commonly held that the specificity of these neurons is brought about by selective convergence of input connections in hierarchically structured feed-forward architectures. This representational strategy allows for rapid processing and is ideally suited for the representation of frequently occurring stereotyped combinations of features; but this strategy is expensive in terms of the number of required neurons and not suited to cope with the virtually infinite diversity of possible feature constellations encountered in real world objects. The second strategy, so the proposal, consists of the temporary association of neurons into functionally coherent assemblies which as a whole represent a particular content whereby each of the participating neurons is tuned to one of the elementary features of composite perceptual objects. This representational strategy is more economical with respect to neuron numbers because a particular neuron can, at different times, participate in different assemblies just as a particular features can be part of many different perceptual objects. Moreover, this representational strategy is more flexible. It allows for the rapid de novo representation of constellations that have never been experienced before because there are virtually no limits to the dynamic association of neurons in ever changing constellations, provided that the participating neurons are interconnected. Thus, for the representation of highly complex and permanently changing contents this second, implicit strategy appears to be better suited than the first explicit strategy. The mechanism that generates the meta-representations required for phenomenal awareness has to cope with contents that are particularly unpredictable and rich in combinatorial complexity. Such meta-representations are necessarily polymodal and need to reconfigurate themselves at the same pace as the contents of phenomenal awareness change. It appears then as if the second representational strategy that is based on the formation of dynamic assemblies would be more suitable for the implementation of meta-representations than the explicit strategy. Further support for this view can be derived from the argument that conditions required for the formation of meta-representations ought to be the same as those required for awareness to occur. Neuronal codes that are readily observable in deep anesthesia, or during slow wave sleep, or in the absence of attention should not be accepted as correlates of awareness or consciousness. As the receptive fields of individual neurons tend to differ only little in awake and anesthetized brains it is unlikely that the explicit representations encoded by individual neurons are the substrate of the meta-representations that support consciousness. As detailed below brain states that are compatible with the manifestation of consciousness also favour the emergence of ordered spatio-temporal activity patterns that could serve as substrate for the formation of assemblies.
The following chapters will, therefore, focus on the question whether there is any evidence that contents are represented not only explicitly by tuned neurons but also by dynamically associated assemblies, and if so, what the electrophysiological manifestations of such assemblies might be. The hypothesis will be forwarded that one signature of assemblies is the synchronization of responses of participating neurons and data will be reviewed which suggest a correlation between the occurrence of response synchronization on the one hand and brain states favourabe for the occurrence of awareness on the other.
The signature of assemblies
In assembly coding two important constraints need to be met. First, a selection mechanism is required that permits dynamic yet consistent association of neurons into distinct, functionally coherent assemblies. Second, responses of neurons that have been identified as groupable must get labelled so that they can be recognized by subsequent processing stages as belonging together. This is necessary in order to assure that responses, once they are bound together, are evaluated jointly as constituents of a coherent code and do not get confounded with responses of cells belonging to other, simultaneously formed assemblies that represent different contents. Numerous theoretical studies have addressed the question of how assemblies can self-organize on the basis of cooperative interactions within associative neuronal networks (Braitenberg, 1978; Edelman, 1987; Palm, 1990; Gerstein and Gochin, 1992) . Here I shall focus on the second problem of assembly coding: the question how responses of cells that have been grouped into an assembly can be tagged as related. An unambiguous signature of relatedness is absolutely crucial for assembly codes because, unlike in explicit single cell codes, the meaning of responses changes with the context in which they are interpreted. Hence, in assembly coding false conjunctions are deleterious. Tagging responses as related is equivalent with assuring that they are processed and evaluated together at the subsequent processing stage. This, in turn, can only be achieved by raising their saliency jointly and selectively, and there are three options. First, non-grouped responses can be inhibited, second, the amplitude of the selected responses can be enhanced, and third, the selected cells can be made to discharge in precise temporal synchrony. All three mechanisms enhance the relative impact of the grouped responses at the next higher processing level. Selecting responses by modulating discharge rates is common in labelled line coding where a particular cell signals always the same content. However, this strategy may not always be suited for the distinction of assemblies because it introduces ambiguities (von der Malsburg, 1985) and reduces processing speed . Ambiguities could arise because discharge rates of feature selective cells vary over a wide range as a function of the match between stimulus and receptive field properties and these modulations of response amplitude would not be distinguishable from those signalling the relatedness of responses. Processing speed would be reduced because rate coded assemblies can only be identified after a sufficient number of spikes has been integrated to distinguish high from low rates. Therefore, they need to be maintained for some time in order to be distinguishable. However, rate coded assemblies cannot overlap in time within the same processing stage because it would be impossible to distinguish which responses belong to which assembly. Together, these factors severely reduce the rate of succession with which different contents can be represented by a given population of neurons.
Both, the ambiguities resulting from stimulus related rate fluctuations and the temporal constraints, can be overcome if the selection and labeling of responses is achieved through synchronization of individual discharges (von der Malsburg, 1985; Gray et al., 1989; Singer and Gray, 1995) . Expressing the relatedness of responses by synchronization resolves the ambiguities resulting from stimulus-dependent rate fluctuations because synchronization can be modulated independently of rates. Response amplitudes could thus be reserved to signal how well particular features match the preferences of neurons, and synchronicity could be used in parallel to signal how these features are related.
Defining assemblies by synchronization also accelerates the rate at which different assemblies can follow one another because the selected event is the individual spike or a brief burst of spikes; saliency is enhanced only for those discharges that are precisely synchronized and generate coincident synaptic potentials in target cells at the subsequent processing stage. The rate at which different assemblies can follow one another without getting confounded is then limited only by the duration of the interval over which synaptic potentials summate effectively (for a detailed discussion see Singer 1999) .
Another advantage of selecting responses by synchronization is that the timing of input events is preserved with high precision in the output activity of cells because synchronized input is transmitted with minimal latency jitter (Abeles, 1982; Softky, 1994; König et al., 1996) . This, in turn, can be exploited to preserve the signature of relatedness across processing stages, thus reducing further the risk of getting false conjunctions.
Finally, synchronization enhances processing speed also by accelerating synaptic transmission per se because synchronized EPSPs trigger action potentials with minimal delay. Cellular prerequisites for selection by synchronization At the level of cellular mechanisms two prerequisites need to be fulfilled in order to exploit synchronization as a coding mechanism: First, neurons must be able to act as coincidence detectors, i. e., they must be particularly sensitive to coincident synaptic inputs. Second, mechanisms must exist which permit rapid and context-dependent temporal coordination of distributed discharge patterns.
The question whether neurons in the central nervous system are capable of performing coincidence detection with the required precision is controversial since both theoretical arguments and simulation studies led to opposite conclusions (Softky, 1994; König et al., 1996; Shadlen and Newsome, 1994) . However, experimental evidence indicates clearly that neurons can evaluate temporal relations among incoming activity with sometimes surprising precision. In the auditory system coincidence detection is used to locate sound sources. Neurons in auditory nuclei of the brainstem evaluate the delays among incoming signals from the two ears with a precision in the submillisecond range (for review see Carr, 1993) . Another example are the oscillatory responses of retinal ganglion cells that can be synchronized over large distances with close to zero phase lag (Neuenschwander and Singer, 1996) . Because of the high frequency of these oscillations (up to 100 Hz) the neuronal mechanism responsible for synchronization must operate with time constants in the millisecond range. This time-modulated activity is reliably transmitted up to cortical neurons as indicated by cross-correlation analysis between retinal ganglion cells and cortical neurons (Castelo-Branco et al. 1998 ). The implication is that neurons along the transmission chain must have operated with integration time constants not longer than a half cycle of the oscillation, and hence no more than 5 ms. The ability of cortical networks to handle temporally structured activity with high precision can also be inferred from the abundant evidence on the oscillatory patterning and synchronization of neuronal responses in the neocortex (reviewed in Singer and Gray, 1995) . Such temporally coordinated discharge patterns can only emerge and stabilize if the temporal structure of activity is preserved during synaptic transmission and does not get dispersed and smeared too much by temporal integration. In the awake performing brain the oscillatory patterning of cortical responses is typically in the gamma frequency range (30 to 60 Hz) and synchronization peaks often have a width at base in the range of 10 to 15 ms, indicating that temporal integration intervals should be on average no longer than 10 ms.
Rapid synchronization
If synchronization is to play a role as signature of assemblies it must be possible to synchronize discharges rapidly because of the constraints set by processing speed.
Early simulation studies which used harmonic oscillators rather than single spiking neurones showed that it may take indeed a few cycles before synchronicity is established through phase locking (König and Schillen, 1991) . However, later simulations with spiking neurones revealed that networks of appropriately coupled units can undergo sudden state changes whereby the synchronization of discharges and their oscillatory patterning occur promptly and virtually simultaneously (for review see Singer et al., 1997) .
Very rapid synchronization has been observed recently in the visual cortex of cats. When neurons were activated by the onset of an appropriately oriented grating stimulus, their initial responses were already better synchronized than expected from mere stimulus locking (Fries et al., 1997a) .
Comparison between actual response latencies and immediately preceding fluctuations of the local field potential revealed that the response latency shifted as a function of the polarity of the preceding field potential fluctuation. Because these fluctuations were not independent between the different recording sites, response latencies became synchronized. Thus, coordinated fluctuations of excitability act like a dynamic filter and cause a virtually instantaneous synchronization of the very first discharges of responses (Fries et al., 1997a) . Since the spatio-temporal patterns of these fluctuations reflect the architecture of intracortical association connections, grouping by synchronization can be extremely fast and still occur as a function of the prewired associational dispositions of the cortical network. Evidence suggests that an oscillatory patterning of responses may be instrumental for the internal synchronization of neurons, in particular when interactions comprise substantial conduction delays or occur across polysynaptic pathways (König et al., 1995) . Experiments in slices support this conjecture, showing that subthreshold oscillatory modulation of the membrane potential is ideally suited to establish synchronization (Volgushev et al., 1998) . In cells with oscillating membrane potential, responses can become delayed considerably, whereby the maximally possible delay interval depends on oscillation frequency and can amount to nearly the duration of one cycle. With such a mechanism, responses to temporally dispersed EPSPs can become synchronized within less than an oscillation cycle in cells exhibiting coherent fluctuations of their membrane potential.
Functional
correlates of response synchronization Perceptual grouping Following the discovery of stimulus related response synchronization among neurones in the cat visual cortex Singer, 1987,1989) , numerous experiments have been performed in search for a correlation between the occurrence of response synchronization and particular stimulus configurations. The prediction to be tested was that synchronization probability should reflect some of the Gestalt-criteria according to which the visual system groups related features during scene segmentation. Among the grouping criteria examined so far are continuity, vicinity, similarity and colinearity in the orientation domain, and common fate in the motion domain (Gray et al., 1989; Engel et al., 1991b,c; Freiwald et al., 1995 for the cat; Kreiter and Singer, 1996 for the monkey). So far, the results of these investigations are compatible with the hypothesis that the probability of response synchronization reflects the Gestaltcriteria applied for perceptual grouping (Fig. 1) . Stimulus-specific response synchronization has been found within and across different areas, and even between hemispheres (for review see Singer and Gray, 1995) and most importantly, none of these synchronization phenomena were detectable by correlating successively recorded responses. This indicates that synchronization was not due to stimulus locking but to internal dynamic coordination of spike timing. Thus, the observed temporal coherence among responses is much greater than expected from mere covariation of event related rate changes.
Studies involving lesions (Engel et al., 1991a; Nowak et al., 1995) Singer, 1992; König et al., 1993) indicate that the interactions responsible for these dynamic synchronization phenomena are mediated to a substantial extent by cortico-cortical connections. The criteria for perceptual grouping should then be reflected in the architecture of these connections and this postulate agrees with the evidence that cortico-cortical connections link preferentially neurons with related feature preferences (for review see Schmidt et al., 1997) . The synchronization observed with a single stimulus does not depend on its particular orientation. (C) Changing orientation and direction of motion by 15 or (D) using one of the bars from the configuration in (B) had little influence on synchronization. Scale bars for the peri-stimulus-time-histograms correspond to 40 spikes/sec. The continuous line superimposed on the correlograms represents a damped cosine function that was fitted to the data to assess the significance of the correlogram modulation. (Modified from Kreiter and Singer, 1996) Response synchronization and behavioural states Most of the early experiments in search of synchronization phenomena have been performed in lightly anaesthetized animals and it was important, therefore, to investigate whether response synchronization occurs also during states where the EEG is actually desynchronized as is characteristic for the awake, attentive brain. Evidence from cats and monkeys indicates that highly precise, internally generated synchrony is considerably more pronounced in the awake than in the anesthetized brain. Whenever tested, and data are available from the primary visual cortex of cats and monkeys, the motion-sensitive areas MT and MST in monkeys and infero-temporal cortex of monkeys, the synchronization phenomena were readily demonstrable and showed a similar dependence on stimulus configuration as the synchronization measured under anesthesia (for review see Singer et al., 1997) .
Of particular interest in this context is the recent finding that response synchronization is especially pronounced when the global EEG desynchronizes and when the animals are attentive. Stimulating the mesencephalic reticular formation in anesthetized animals leads to a transient desynchronization of the EEG, resembling the transition from slow wave sleep to rapid eye movement sleep. Munk et al. (1996) have recently shown that stimulus-specific synchronization of neuronal responses is drastically facilitated when the EEG is in a desynchronized rather than in a synchronized state.
Direct evidence for an attention related facilitation of synchronization has been obtained from cats that had been trained to perform a visually triggered motor response . Simultaneous recordings from visual, association, somatosensory and motor areas revealed that the cortical areas involved in the execution of the task synchronized their activity, predominantly with zero phase-lag, as soon as the animals prepared themselves for the task and focused their attention on the relevant stimulus. Immediately after the appearance of the visual stimulus, synchronization increased further over the recorded areas, and these coordinated activation patterns were maintained until the task was completed. However, once the reward was available and the animals engaged in consumatory behaviour, these coherent patterns collapsed and gave way to low frequency oscillatory activity that did not exhibit any consistent phase relations. This close correspondence between the execution of an attention demanding visuo-motor performance and the occurrence of zero phase-lag synchrony suggests a functional role of the temporal patterning. One possibility is that the synchronization observed during the preparatory period reflects an entrainment of activity into a temporal pattern that is common to selected cortical areas in order to facilitate rapid temporal coordination of signals once the stimulus has become available. Attentional mechanisms could impose a coherent subthreshold modulation on neurons in cortical areas that need to participate in the execution of the anticipated task and thereby permit rapid synchronization of selected responses using the synchronizing mechanisms described above. According to this scenario, the attentional mechanisms would induce what one might call a state of expectancy in the respective cortical areas by imposing on them a specific, task-related dynamic activation pattern which then, once stimulus-driven input becomes available, acts like a dynamic filter that causes rapid synchronization of selected responses, thereby accomplishing the required grouping and binding of responses and in addition assuring rapid transmissions.
Perception
In a series of visual experiments attempts have been made to find correlations between perceptual disturbances and abnormalities in neuronal synchronization. Kittens were made strabismic shortly after eye opening which results in an inability to group into a coherent percept signals generated by the two eyes. This inability is reflected by the failure of neurones driven by the two eyes to synchronize their responses even if these are evoked by a single object (König et al.,1993) . A likely reason for the disruption of response synchronization is that the tangential intracortical connections between neurones driven by different eyes are lost during early development due to consistent decorrelation of the responses evoked from the two eyes (Löwel and Singer, 1992) .
A subgroup of the strabismic animals developed in addition a syndrome called strabismic amblyopia. Subjects suffering from strabismic amblyopia, and this is true for both animals and humans, have reduced visual acuity in the amblyopic eye. Moreover, they have difficulties to identify figures if these are embedded in a contour-rich background suggesting problems with perceptual grouping. In these amblyopic animals there was a close correlation between perceptual deficits and abnormalities in response synchronization but there was no evidence for abnormalities of the response properties of individual cells. Quite unexpectedly, neurones in the primary visual cortex responded equally well to visual stimuli irrespective of whether these were shown to the normal or to the amblyopic eye. Thus, neurons driven by the amblyopic eye continued to respond vigorously to gratings that the animals had not been able to resolve with this eye during previous behavioural testing. Responses mediated by the normal and the amblyopic eye showed no difference in their amplitude or feature specific tuning irrespective of the spatial frequency of the applied test gratings. The only significant difference was the reduced ability of neurones driven by the amblyopic eye to synchronize their responses, and this difference was particularly pronounced when the spatial frequency of the grating stimuli approached the range beyond which the animals had no longer been able to resolve gratings with the amblyopic eye (Roelfsema et al., 1994) .
In primary visual cortex, there is, thus, a close correlation between a specific perceptual deficit and alterations in synchronization; and this relation could very well be causal. If synchronization is used to group responses together and to label them for further joint processing then one expects that disturbances in synchronization should lead to disturbances in perceptual grouping such as occur for interocular binding operations in all strabismic animals and for monocular grouping operations in animals suffering from strabismic amblyopia. Since reduced synchronization is likely to reduce the saliency of responses conveyed by the amblyopic eye it can also account for the fact that the amblyopic eye consistently looses in interocular competition when both eyes are open. Here, then, is a clear case where the firing of neurons in a cortical area does not correspond to perception, suggesting that the firing of individual neurons is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition to support perception. Additional and in this case indispensable information appears to be conveyed by the precise temporal relations among the discharges of simultaneously active neurons.
Another close correlation between response synchronization and perception and a remarkable dissociation between responses of individual neurons and perception has been found in experiments on binocular rivalry. When the two eyes are presented with patterns that cannot be fused into a single coherent percept, the two patterns are perceived in alternation rather than as a superposition of their components. This implies that there is a central gating mechanism which selects in alternation the signals arriving from the two eyes for further processing. Interocular rivalry is thus a suitable paradigm to investigate the neuronal correlates of dynamic response selection, a process closely related to the formation of assemblies. This paradigm has been applied to investigate how neuronal responses that are selected and perceived differ from those that are suppressed and excluded from supporting perception. Multiunit and field potential responses were recorded with chronically implanted electrodes from up to 30 sites in cat primary visual cortex while the animals were exposed to rivalrous stimulation conditions (Fries et al., 1997b) . Because the animal performs tracking eye movements only for the pattern that is actually perceived, patterns moving in opposite directions were presented dichoptically in order to determine from the optokinetic tracking response which of the two eyes is selected. The outcome of these experiments was surprising as it turned out that the discharge rate of neurons in primary visual cortex failed to reflect the suppression of input from the respective non-dominant eye. A close and highly significant correlation existed, however, between changes in the strength of response synchronization and the outcome of rivalry. Cells mediating responses of the eye that won in interocular competition increased the synchronicity of their responses upon introduction of the rivalrous stimulus while the reverse was true for cells driven by the eye that became suppressed. Thus, in this particular case of competition, selection of responses for further processing appears to be achieved by raising their saliency through synchronization rather than enhancing discharge frequency. Likewise, suppression is not achieved by inhibiting responses but by desynchronization (Fig 2) . These results provide direct support for the hypothesis that precise temporal relations between the discharges of spatially distributed neurons matter in cortical processing and that synchronization may be exploited to jointly raise the saliency of the responses selected for further processing. The important point here is that this selection can obviously be achieved without inhibiting the non-selected responses. Thus, in principle, it should be possible to select a second group of responses by synchronizing them independently of the first. The result would be two coexisting, but functionally distinct, assemblies at the same processing level. The example of rivalry also illustrates how synchronization and rate modulation depend on each other. The signals from the suppressed eye failed to induce tracking eye movements, indicating that eventually the vigorous but poorly synchronized responses in primary visual areas failed to drive the neurons responsible for the execution of eye movements. Direct evidence for the failure of neurons at subsequent processing stages to respond to the input from the respective suppressed eye has been obtained in behaving monkeys trained to indicate which of the two eyes they were actually using (Logothetis et al., 1996; Logothetis & Schall 1989) . This convertibility provides the option to use both coding strategies in parallel in order to encode complementary information (see above).
In conclusion the data reviewed in this chapter indicate that evaluation of internally generated correlation patterns between responses of simultaneously recorded neurons permits the extraction of information about stimulus configurations, behavioural states and perception that cannot be obtained by analyzing the responses of individual neurons sequentially. The relevant variable containing this additional information is the rather precise synchronization of a fraction of the discharges constituting the respective responses. The data indicate further that responses containing synchronized epochs have a higher probability of being processed further and eventually to be perceived than responses lacking such synchronized epochs, supporting the hypothesis that synchronization is used as a mechanism for response selection. Since synchronization necessarily involves at least two neurons it inevitably raises simultaneously the saliency of more then one response. It is thus well suited to select subsets of responses for further joint processing, thereby defining the group of selected responses as related. Thus, synchronization fulfills the requirements postulated for a binding mechanism that selects from a larger number of simultaneously active neurons a subset and labels the responses of this subset in a way that favours joint processing at the subsequent processing stage. The evidence that synchronization probability reflects Gestaltcriteria which guide perceptual grouping supports the hypothesis that synchronization serves as a binding mechanism in the context of assembly formation by jointly raising the saliency of selected subsets of responses.
The Generality of Synchronicity
Studies in non-visual sensory modalities and in the motor system indicate that synchrony and oscillatory activity may actually be quite ubiquitous in the nervous system. Synchronization in the gamma frequency range occurs in the olfactory system of various vertebrate and invertebrate species, where it has been related to the processing of odor information (for review see Laurent, 1996) . In the auditory cortex, synchronized gamma oscillations have been described both in humans (for review see Joliot et al., ) and in animals (Eggermont, 1992; deCharms and Merzenich, 1996) . In the somatosensory system, synchronized oscillatory activity in this frequency range has recently been described both in the cat (Steriade et al., 1996) and in the monkey (Murthy and Fetz, 1996) . Furthermore, synchronized oscillatory firing has been observed in other systems like the hippocampus (Buzsáki and Chrobak, 1995) and the frontal cortex (Vaadia et al., 1995) .
Similar evidence is available for the motor system where neural synchronization in the gamma frequency range has been discovered in cats (Steriade et al., 1996) , monkeys (Murthy and Fetz, 1996; Sanes and Donoghue, 1993) and humans (Kristeva-Feige et al., 1993) .
Synchrony may also play a role in sensorimotor integration. In awake behaving monkeys, task-dependent synchronization between units distributed across sensory and motor cortical areas and within motor cortex itself has been reported (Murthy and Fetz, 1996; Sanes and Donoghue, 1993; Ojakangas et al., 1997; Riehle et al., 1997) . Thus, synchrony also seems to play a role in visuomotor coordination and in the programming of motor responses. As proposed previously, it may be instrumental for the flexible channeling (binding) of sensory signals to particular motor programs .
Synchronization also seems to play a role in the linkage between cortical assemblies and subcortical target structures such as the superior colliculus. This possibility is suggested by the existence of precise temporal relationships between the discharges of neurons in areas of the visual cortex and the superior colliculus (Brecht et al., 1998) . In these experiments, it could be shown that corticotectal interactions are strongly dependent on the temporal coherence of cortical activity. If cortical neurons engage in synchronous oscillatory activity either with partners within the same cortical area or with cells in other cortical areas, their impact on tectal cells is enhanced, indicating that tectal cells are driven more effectively by synchronous than by asynchronous cortical activity. This finding is consistent with the idea that the temporal organization of activity patterns plays an important role in defining the output of the cortex.
Taken together, available evidence suggests that comparable synchronization phenomena are found in a large number of different functional systems. Thus, it seems justified to generalize the results obtained in the visual cortex and to suggest that temporal coordination of discharges may be of general relevance for neural information processing. Importantly, there is increasing evidence that dynamic synchronization, in particular at frequencies in the gamma band, occurs also in the human brain. EEG studies have provided evidence for precise synchronization of activity in the -frequency range in human visual cortex that is related to perception and reflects the subjective coherence of stimulus arrangements (Tallon-Baudry et al., 1996 Rodriguez et al. 1999; Miltner et al. 1999 ).
Synchronicity as a General Code for Relatedness
If synchronicity serves as the signature of relatedness, synchronized responses should be interpreted as being related, irrespective of the cause of synchronization. Psychophysical evidence supports this conjecture, indicating that snychronously presented stimuli are bound perceptually and interpreted as elements of the same figure with greater probability than asynchronously appearing texture elements (Leonards et al., 1996; Leonards and Singer, ISSN 1303 5150 www.neuroquantology.com 149 1997; Leonards and Singer, 1998; Alais et al., 1998; Usher & Donelly, 1998 ; but see Kiper et al., 1996) . Hence, the synchronicity of responses imposed by simultaneously appearing texture elements (stimulus locked synchronization) seems to be exploited for perceptual grouping. With respect to their strength and temporal precision the externally induced and internally generated synchrony is virtually indistinguishable. Since the psychophysical results indicate that the former is interpreted as a signature of relatedness it would be puzzling if this were not the case also for internally generated synchrony. Synchronization could, thus, serve as a general tag of relatedness irrespective of whether it results from coincidence of external events or from internal grouping operations.
Conclusion
The hypothesis defended here is based on the following assumptions: i) phenomenal awareness emerges from the formation of meta-representations, ii) these are realized by the addition of cortical areas of higher order that process the output of lower order areas in the same way as these process their respective input, iii) in order to account for the required combinatorial flexibility these meta-representations are likely to be implemented by the dynamic association of distributed neurons into functionally coherent assemblies rather than by individual specialized cells, iv) the binding mechanism that groups neurons into assemblies and labels their responses as related is the transient synchronization of discharges with a precision in the millisecond range, v) the formation of such dynamically associated, synchronized cell assemblies requires activated brain states characterized by "desynchronized" EEG and is facilitated by attentional mechanisms. The first assumption differs from the others because it is a conceptual premise which by itself does not provide any experimentally testable predictions; but each of the following subordinate assumptions leads to predictions about structural and functional features of brains capable of generating meta-representations. The data reviewed above illustrate that there is supportive experimental evidence for many of these features. However, we are lacking the proof that the observed features actually serve the function that our theories assign to them. This is the case not only for the more recently discovered functional properties such as the transient synchronization of distributed neuronal responses but also for the rate modulated discharges of individual neurons. As long as we have no complete theory on the structure of neuronal representations, it cannot be decided whether a sequence of discharges of a particular unit signifies that this unit participates in an assembly that lasts as long as the sequence of discharges or whether the unit participates in several different, successively organized assemblies, or whether it represents a content on its own. This uncertainty is due to the difficulty to identify assemblies. Assemblies can only be identified if one succeeds to record simultaneously from a sufficiently large fraction of neurons actually participating in a particular assembly. For reasons detailed elsewhere this is technically very demanding and therefore attempts to identify assemblies are still at the very beginning. Thus, if it is the case that the generation of the meta-representations required for consciousness involves the organization of highly distributed assemblies, we are a long way from the direct identification of the neuronal correlates of even the simplest forms of consciousness.
As long as analysis remains confined to the activity of individual neurons it will 
